Papers

We heard a lecture today by Mike Huemer on a paper in which he argues that ontological parsimony may not be a virtue of philosophical theories. I enjoyed the paper because I've never been a big fan of Occam or his razor.

I'll be working on some papers for the remainder of the summer and into the fall:

(1) My paper arguing against hybrid theories for the Colorado Summer Seminar/writing sample

(2) A paper for my phil. of math independent study, probably on either fictionalism in mathematics or structuralism

(3) A paper on the philosophy of math to present to some mathematicians at WVU, probably just an historical survey of some realist and anti-realist positions.

a new sort of truth?

Here's the gist of a brief exchange today in seminar:

student A: "Even if most people in the world think something, we wouldn't want to say that it's true necessarily."
student B: "Why wouldn't you?"

student B is crazy.

van Fraassen lecture

We heard a lecture today from Bas van Fraassen concerning values in science. The discussion that followed seemed to move toward the case against metaphysics. Van Fraassen, and many people at the seminar, seem to think that metaphysics is a useless field and should be abandoned. They claim that science is about getting at truth and that metaphysics cannot get at truth. Most, if not all, claims in metaphysics cannot be verified. For instance, we will (probably) never know if properties really exist or if there is an infinity of possible worlds spatiotemporally isolated from us. Another big topic in metaphysics is the philosophy of time and the debate between presentists and eternalists. Relativity, though, seems to suggest an answer to this debate. When an appeal to relativity is made though, it is no longer considered metaphysics but rather philosophy of physics or even just physics.

As a response, I, as a (future?) metaphysician say that metaphysicians do not claim to be doing science. Furthermore, most do not claim to be getting at truth. They rather are considering ways the world could be and arguing for which theory is the best from an intuitive, logical, etc. standpoint. It is certainly not as applicable as physics or any other science, but no metaphysician would argue with this claim. In the field, there seems to be a sort of overarching qualification that the work being done is all highly speculative. I think that metaphysics has at least these values:

1. An exercise in rigor. Metaphysics seems to be one of the more rigorous areas of philosophy. In ethics, for example, there are many appeals to intuition or feelings. While intuition certainly plays a role in metaphysics, deductive arguments seem to be prominent.

2. Providing support for 'real' scientific theories on the basis of these rigorous arguments. If some new scientific theory claims something very strange, metaphysics can then examine the claim and/or theory for conceptual problems, contradictions, etc. This is not to claim that metaphysics can falsify a scientific theory. If the evidence for the theory continues to accumulate, metaphysicians are very willing to 'give in.'

Metaphysics cannot generally get at truth, but as long as metaphysicians realize this, there is no harm, and it is likely that there is some advantage, in doing metaphysics.

books

Here's a list of books that I want to get/read before I go to grad school:

Objects and Persons, Trenton Merricks
Truth and Ontology, Trenton Merricks
Philosophical Papers, Vols. I and II, David Lewis
Lewisian Themes, a collection
Occasions of Identity, Andre Gallois
Truth and Truthmakers, D.M. Armstrong
any of the volumes of Oxford Studies in Metaphysics
Readings in the Philosophy of Language, ed. Ludlow
Vaule, Reality, and Desire, Graham Oddie
Fictionalism in Metaphsyics, Mark Eli Kalderon
Person and Object, Roderick Chisholm
Persistence, a collection ed. Haslanger

Summer Seminar

I'm currently at the Colorado Summer Seminar, which is awesome. However, I've encountered some strange views:

(1) Reality can be described by two different people in contradictory ways, and both can be correct. There is no objective fact of the matter to questions like "Are objects just bundles of properties?" and "Do universals exist?"

(2) If everyone agrees that proposition P is true, and you have a justified belief in P, then you know P. The apparently unpalatable consequence of this view, that people way back when knew that the earth is flat, was welcomed with open arms.

(3) If I see a red notebook on the table, not only am I not justified in believing that there is a notebook on the table, I am likely not justified in believing that I am having a red notebook experience.

I don't have arguments against these views, I guess. But those who had these views didn't offer me arguments for them; they seemed obviously true to those people, just as they seem obviously false to me.

I've started rewriting my writing sample. Merricks, Tooley, and Sider (probably) have agreed to have a look at it for me, so hopefully it will end up being a good paper. It seems that famous philosophers are willing to help out lowly undergraduates. I'm arguing that hybrid theories of time are incoherent-not a new position by any means. I'm hoping to have a draft ready to send off to some people by the end of the Summer Seminar here in Colorado. A professor at WVU has offered to do an independent study with me to develop the paper, so that should help as well.

Tentative List

Here is a list of the Ph.D. programs in philosophy that I plan on applying to (in no particular order), and why I'm interested in the program:

University of Massachussetts:
The program here is strong in metaphysics, and regularly offer courses in the philosophy of math, logic, and philosophy of language. The courses that have been taught at UMass over the last few semesters are very appealing, and I enjoy reading the work by UMass Ph.D.'s.

New York University:
It's NYU. That's about it. They are strong in all of the areas I'm interested in and many that I'm not. Plus, Ted Sider recently accepted a position there, and the opportunity to work with him would be impossible to pass up.

Rutgers:
Again, it's Rutgers. Sider just left, which is bad, but the faculty is still amazing. Working with philosophers like Zimmerman and Goldman would be great.

Syracuse University:
Syracuse is strong in metaphysics and they have Kris McDaniel who was in the Monads. I'm sold. Plus, I feel like I have a better shot (though still not great) of being admitted here than I would at somewhere like NYU or Rutgers.

University of Virginia:
Working with Merricks would be great, but I'm not sure how many other philosophers here I've read. The campus is close to home, which would be nice.

University of Colorado, Boulder:
I'm actually here right now at the Summer Seminar. The campus and surrounding area are beautiful, and Boulder seems like a great place to live. As far as the program goes, I could work with Tooley, Forbes, and Huemer.

Rochester:
Rochester is ranked near the bottom on the Leiter Report, but they are strong in epistemology and philosophy of language. David Braun is there, and he's great. Two of my professors went here, and I love the way they do philosophy (which has become the way I do philosophy).

Ohio State:
The opportunity to work with people like Shapiro and Caplan is exciting. The midwest is not a place I'm very excited about living, but OSU has a great program for metaphysics and philosophy of math.

UC Santa Barbara:
The department is small, but the graduate student interviews all seemed positive (as if they would put negative comments on the website). UCSB fares well in the areas I'm most interested in, and Santa Barbara would be a nice place to live for a few years.

UC Davis:
UCD has lots of philosophers working in the philosophy of language and in metaphysics. This is another school where I feel like my chances of getting in may reach double digits.

UCLA:
David Kaplan is there, and they have an incredibly strong department overall. My girlfriend would love to go to UCLA, so that's an obvious selling point.

Massachussetts Institute of Technology:
MIT is very strong in the philosophy of language, and another department that is a powerhouse in almost any area.

University of Wisconsin, Madison:
UWM has a solid program. They fare pretty well in most of the areas I'm interested in.

Notre Dame:
ND is great in metaphysics with van Inwagen, Plantinga, Rea, etc. Again, in the midwest, but I probably won't have to worry about turning down ND, because I'd have to be accepted first.

There are a handful of other schools that I will probably apply to: Brown, Univ. of Southern California, UT Austin, and Florida come to mind. If I follow through with this blog, I'll update as the application procedure begins.