Here is something interesting to think about, due, as is often the case, to David Lewis. This is in footnote 6 of his paper "Tensed Quantifiers" which is in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 1.
Assume there is a first sunrise, and that every sunrise forevermore is followed by another, and that time isn't circular.
Is it true that there will have been infinitely many sunrises?
(Just to be clear, "will have been" is used like this: On January 2nd, 2009, there will have been a celebration for New Years 2009.)
My first intuition is that no, there will not have been infinitely many sunrises. I'll think about it a little more though.
Wednesday, January 16, 2008
Monday, January 14, 2008
What's so bad about metaphysics?
So, what is the problem with metaphysics? Here are just a couple things I've heard in the last 6 months or so:
1. At the summer seminar in Colorado, a famous philosopher suggested that the best way to deal with metaphysicians, since you couldn't convince them that what they do is useless, is to make fun of them.
2. Many of the seminar participants, and several faculty in attendance, laughed at this, and seemed to agree.
3. One of my friends reported to a professor that he had developed an interest in the philosophy of time. His professor responded "Oh. That's too bad."
4. On the Leiter Reports (http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2008/01/as-a-profession.html), a question came up as to the status of philosophy as a profession, today as compared with 10 years ago. First of all, many of the answers did not address the question (they seemed to leave out the "...as a profession..." part). But, ignoring that little formality, here are two of the responses:
"The return of a highly scholastic metaphysics means it's worse: there is a return of "intuition" masquerading as the a priori and a highly suspect self-image that metaphysics is just like science, except without the need toleave the armchair, which is about parallel to entering Formula 1 races without an engine." - Simon Blackburn
"...a priorism is less widely prevalent than it was at the height of the "analytical" philosophy movement. That's surely a good thing." - Jerry Fodor
I happen to like metaphysics. And I happen to like a priori sorts of arguments. Granted, I am more easily moved by arguments which are informed by other disciplines, but I can also be convinced by a good a priori, armchair style argument. I think that if, given some view and some additional plausible (a priori) premises, we can derive a conclusion that conflicts heavily with our intuitions, we have a reason to doubt that view. No knock-down arguments, sure, but we can get some good reasons for doubt.
So, what is so bad about metaphysics? Why do some philosophers seem to have such a distaste for it?
1. At the summer seminar in Colorado, a famous philosopher suggested that the best way to deal with metaphysicians, since you couldn't convince them that what they do is useless, is to make fun of them.
2. Many of the seminar participants, and several faculty in attendance, laughed at this, and seemed to agree.
3. One of my friends reported to a professor that he had developed an interest in the philosophy of time. His professor responded "Oh. That's too bad."
4. On the Leiter Reports (http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2008/01/as-a-profession.html), a question came up as to the status of philosophy as a profession, today as compared with 10 years ago. First of all, many of the answers did not address the question (they seemed to leave out the "...as a profession..." part). But, ignoring that little formality, here are two of the responses:
"The return of a highly scholastic metaphysics means it's worse: there is a return of "intuition" masquerading as the a priori and a highly suspect self-image that metaphysics is just like science, except without the need toleave the armchair, which is about parallel to entering Formula 1 races without an engine." - Simon Blackburn
"...a priorism is less widely prevalent than it was at the height of the "analytical" philosophy movement. That's surely a good thing." - Jerry Fodor
I happen to like metaphysics. And I happen to like a priori sorts of arguments. Granted, I am more easily moved by arguments which are informed by other disciplines, but I can also be convinced by a good a priori, armchair style argument. I think that if, given some view and some additional plausible (a priori) premises, we can derive a conclusion that conflicts heavily with our intuitions, we have a reason to doubt that view. No knock-down arguments, sure, but we can get some good reasons for doubt.
So, what is so bad about metaphysics? Why do some philosophers seem to have such a distaste for it?
Friday, January 11, 2008
Philosophers
While I'm thinking about it, I'll list the one (or two) professors at each school I've applied to that I'd look forward to working with the most (based on what I've read).
NYU - Ted Sider (1st overall choice of any professor anywhere), Hartry Field
Rutgers - Dean Zimmerman, (and Cian Dorr if he moves from Pitt; he has an offer)
Princeton - Probably Delia Graff-Fara, though they have a whole bunch of young LEMMings
MIT - Stephen Yablo
UNC - Thomas Hofweber
UMass - Philip Bricker
Colorado - Michael Tooley, Michael Huemer, David Barnett (more here because I've met them)
UCSB - Nathan Salmon
UVA - Trenton Merricks (I would be really excited to work with him, but unfortunately he's one of the few at UVA that I would really be interested in working with)
Rochester - David Braun, Earl Conee
CUNY - Michael Devitt, Saul Kripke (come on, Kripke!)
UCLA - David Kaplan
USC - David Manley, Scott Soames
Looking at this list, obviously most do metaphysics, which is what I'd say my primary area of interest is, but I notice that many (Sider, Dorr, Yablo, Hofweber, Manley, at least) do some meta-ontology, which I could really get into if given the opportunity, I think.
NYU - Ted Sider (1st overall choice of any professor anywhere), Hartry Field
Rutgers - Dean Zimmerman, (and Cian Dorr if he moves from Pitt; he has an offer)
Princeton - Probably Delia Graff-Fara, though they have a whole bunch of young LEMMings
MIT - Stephen Yablo
UNC - Thomas Hofweber
UMass - Philip Bricker
Colorado - Michael Tooley, Michael Huemer, David Barnett (more here because I've met them)
UCSB - Nathan Salmon
UVA - Trenton Merricks (I would be really excited to work with him, but unfortunately he's one of the few at UVA that I would really be interested in working with)
Rochester - David Braun, Earl Conee
CUNY - Michael Devitt, Saul Kripke (come on, Kripke!)
UCLA - David Kaplan
USC - David Manley, Scott Soames
Looking at this list, obviously most do metaphysics, which is what I'd say my primary area of interest is, but I notice that many (Sider, Dorr, Yablo, Hofweber, Manley, at least) do some meta-ontology, which I could really get into if given the opportunity, I think.
acceptance dates
Between the who_got_in livejournal community and this blog: http://blogicalnecessity.blogspot.com/
and this blog:
http://angasm.org/2007/04/philosophy-phd-programs.html
I've compiled a list of the first acceptance dates for the schools I've applied to, except for Rochester. Here goes:
UCSB – 1/25
USC – 2/5 accept, 2/23 reject
UNC – 2/8 accept, 2/10 reject
UVA – 2/9
UCLA – 2/14 accept, 3/1 reject
Umass – 2/21, 3/15
MIT – by 2/24
Princeton - 2/28
NYU – 2/28
CUNY – 2/28, 3/1
Rutgers – 3/1, 3/2
Colorado – 3/4
These are the dates when people first published acceptances (and in some cases rejections) to these schools. So, I suppose these were schools' first round of offers. Once people start declining, I imagine schools extend offers (of admission and funding) to people on the wait-list (for admission and funding). I was surprised to see how early things seem to happen. I didn't expect to hear from schools until late February - late March. But, it appears that by the first week of March, most places have made their initial offers. Hopefully, I'll get an acceptance early on to relieve at least a little stress.
In other news, I have my plane ticket to go present at Rice in February. That should be a good time, with several of my Colorado seminar co-attendees there.
and this blog:
http://angasm.org/2007/04/philosophy-phd-programs.html
I've compiled a list of the first acceptance dates for the schools I've applied to, except for Rochester. Here goes:
UCSB – 1/25
USC – 2/5 accept, 2/23 reject
UNC – 2/8 accept, 2/10 reject
UVA – 2/9
UCLA – 2/14 accept, 3/1 reject
Umass – 2/21, 3/15
MIT – by 2/24
Princeton - 2/28
NYU – 2/28
CUNY – 2/28, 3/1
Rutgers – 3/1, 3/2
Colorado – 3/4
These are the dates when people first published acceptances (and in some cases rejections) to these schools. So, I suppose these were schools' first round of offers. Once people start declining, I imagine schools extend offers (of admission and funding) to people on the wait-list (for admission and funding). I was surprised to see how early things seem to happen. I didn't expect to hear from schools until late February - late March. But, it appears that by the first week of March, most places have made their initial offers. Hopefully, I'll get an acceptance early on to relieve at least a little stress.
In other news, I have my plane ticket to go present at Rice in February. That should be a good time, with several of my Colorado seminar co-attendees there.
Sunday, January 6, 2008
LEMMings blog
This is a blog dedicated to discussing issues in Language, Epistemology, Metaphysics, and Mind (Brian Weatherson (I think; I don't feel like checking on it) tagged philosophers who work in these areas `LEMMings'). Since I am/will be a LEMMing, I'll post a link to the blog:
http://lemmingsblog.blogspot.com/
http://lemmingsblog.blogspot.com/
Friday, January 4, 2008
Why I want to be a philosopher
I've spent the last couple days filing/labeling/moving big boxes full of files. I'm doing some work for the company my uncle works for while I'm home for Christmas. So, I get all the dullness of working in an office but all the strain of doing heavy lifting. It's sweet.
The point is, I think the main reason I want to be a philosopher is so that I can, for the most part, avoid lifting things.
The point is, I think the main reason I want to be a philosopher is so that I can, for the most part, avoid lifting things.
Wednesday, January 2, 2008
Online logic book
Ted Sider has put a draft of a logic textbook he is writing online:
http://tedsider.org/books/lfp/lfp.pdf
Also useful, Sider has put up many (all?) of his papers:
http://tedsider.org/papers/papers.shtml
Also useful, a list of bibliographies for several topics in metaphysics"
http://tedsider.org/bibliographies/bibliographies.shtml
Lastly, I've found this useful. It's the bibliography Sider put up for a meta-ontology seminar he taught with links to the papers in lots of cases:
http://fas-philosophy.rutgers.edu/sider/teaching/MO06/metaontology_bib.pdf
Thanks to my friend Matt for reminding me about the logic book. And thanks to Ted Sider for putting up all of this awesome philosophy stuff.
http://tedsider.org/books/lfp/lfp.pdf
Also useful, Sider has put up many (all?) of his papers:
http://tedsider.org/papers/papers.shtml
Also useful, a list of bibliographies for several topics in metaphysics"
http://tedsider.org/bibliographies/bibliographies.shtml
Lastly, I've found this useful. It's the bibliography Sider put up for a meta-ontology seminar he taught with links to the papers in lots of cases:
http://fas-philosophy.rutgers.edu/sider/teaching/MO06/metaontology_bib.pdf
Thanks to my friend Matt for reminding me about the logic book. And thanks to Ted Sider for putting up all of this awesome philosophy stuff.
Tuesday, January 1, 2008
Modal realism and primitive modality
I went to a great New Year party last night with some of my philosophy friends and some of my non-philosophy friends. As is often the case, the non-philosophy friends had to deal with lots of philosophy talk/jokes.
My friend Brandon and I were discussing Lewis's modal realism, and he complained that believing in the plurality of worlds does not eliminate primitive modality. Lewis certainly had other reasons for believing in possible worlds, but the (supposed) ability to eliminate primitive modality seems to me the best reason.
I feel like I've seen a complaint similar to Brandon's someplace (possibly in OPOW...I didn't bring my copy home...I've been missing out on my weekly devotions), but I can't remember where. His complaint was that even given modal realism, it is a question which worlds exist. The obvious answer would be "the possible ones". But, of course, if the possible worlds are meant to eliminate primitive modality, then this is circular. Or so goes the complaint.
I'm not sure what to say. I think this may be a problem for Lewis. But, maybe there are a few things to say on his behalf.
1. This complaint seems more epistemic; Lewis meant to describe the world(s), not how we know about it.
2. We have a good criteria for deciding which worlds exist; the ones which can be completely described without giving contradictory claims. I could have said that more clearly, probably. The idea is that, we use one sentence to describe every fact about a given world W. So, we get a list of sentences (maybe finite, maybe infinite), each different from the others:
S1, S2, S3, ... (assume there are infinitely many facts about W).
So, every fact about W is given by some Si in our list and there is no Si such that Si does not describe some fact about W.
So, to find out if W exists, just make sure that no two Si's are contradictory:
If our list includes Si and Sj, and we have that Si -> ~Sj, then W does not exist.
That seems to me a perfectly good criteria for deciding which worlds exist which does not rely on taking modality as primitive. This seems to be, in fact, what we mean by a possible world (as opposed to an impossible world). It seems to me to be so obviously what we mean by a possible world that my little speil above is boring and trivial. Oh well.
My friend Brandon and I were discussing Lewis's modal realism, and he complained that believing in the plurality of worlds does not eliminate primitive modality. Lewis certainly had other reasons for believing in possible worlds, but the (supposed) ability to eliminate primitive modality seems to me the best reason.
I feel like I've seen a complaint similar to Brandon's someplace (possibly in OPOW...I didn't bring my copy home...I've been missing out on my weekly devotions), but I can't remember where. His complaint was that even given modal realism, it is a question which worlds exist. The obvious answer would be "the possible ones". But, of course, if the possible worlds are meant to eliminate primitive modality, then this is circular. Or so goes the complaint.
I'm not sure what to say. I think this may be a problem for Lewis. But, maybe there are a few things to say on his behalf.
1. This complaint seems more epistemic; Lewis meant to describe the world(s), not how we know about it.
2. We have a good criteria for deciding which worlds exist; the ones which can be completely described without giving contradictory claims. I could have said that more clearly, probably. The idea is that, we use one sentence to describe every fact about a given world W. So, we get a list of sentences (maybe finite, maybe infinite), each different from the others:
S1, S2, S3, ... (assume there are infinitely many facts about W).
So, every fact about W is given by some Si in our list and there is no Si such that Si does not describe some fact about W.
So, to find out if W exists, just make sure that no two Si's are contradictory:
If our list includes Si and Sj, and we have that Si -> ~Sj, then W does not exist.
That seems to me a perfectly good criteria for deciding which worlds exist which does not rely on taking modality as primitive. This seems to be, in fact, what we mean by a possible world (as opposed to an impossible world). It seems to me to be so obviously what we mean by a possible world that my little speil above is boring and trivial. Oh well.
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